NAP is a protocol for supporting fault-tolerance in intinerant computations. It employs a form of failure detection and recovery, and it generalizes the primarybackup approach to a new compuational model. The guarantees o ered by NAP as well as an implementation for NAP in tacoma are discussed.
Introduction
One use of mobile agents is support for itinerant computation 5 . An itinerant computation is a program that moves from host to host in a network. Which hosts the program visits is determined by the program. The program can have a pre-de ned itinerary or can dynamically compute the next host to visit as it visits each successive host; it can visit the same host repeatedly or it can even create multiple concurrent copies of itself on a single host.
Itinerant computations are susceptible to processor failures, communications failures, and crashes due to program bugs. Prior work in fault-tolerance for itinerant computations has focused on the use of replication and masking. For example, 14 discusses a technique for replicating on independently failing processors the environment|herein called a landing pad| in which an itinerant computation executes. Thus, failures are masked below the landing pad and the programmer of an itinerant computation need not be concerned with handling them.
Replication and masking, however, has limitations because replication requires redundant processing, which is expensive. Furthermore, preserving the necessary consistency between replicas can be done efciently only within a local-area network. Replication and masking approaches are also unable to tolerate program bugs. Thus, a fault-tolerance method based on failure detection and recovery seems the better choice when itinerant compuations must operate beyond a local area network and must employ potentially buggy software.
We present such a fault-tolerance method in this paper. It has roots in the primary-backup approach 1, 4 , only with the xed backup processors being replaced by mobile agents called rear guards 9 . With our method, a rear guard performs some recovery action and continues the itinerant computation after a failure is detected.
The key di erences between our approach and the primary-backup approach are:
Unlike a backup which, in response to a failure, continues executing the program that was running, a recovering rear guard executes recovery code. The recovery code can be identical to the code that was executing when the failure occurred, but it need not be. Rear guards are not executed by a single, xed, set of backups. Instead, rear guards are hosted by landing pads where the itinerant computation recently executed. Much of what is novel about NAP stems from the need to orchestrate rear guards as the itinerant computation moves from host to host. We call our protocol NAP. 1 The idea for such a protocol was rst discussed in 9 . This paper eshes out the idea, describing the tacoma 8 landing-pad support for NAP and the guarantees that NAP can provide to programmers. We also discuss an actual Python-based implementation of NAP.
Assumptions
In tacoma, an itinerant computation is structured from mobile agents. Each host in the network is assumed to run a landing pad; a mobile agent is started on host H by giving the landing pad at H the program text and the initial state of the agent.
A program running on a host can crash, and a host or landing pad can crash thereby crashing all programs running on that host or landing pad. When a mobile agent terminates as a result of one of these crashes, we say that execution of the agent has experienced a fault. We assume that a fault is eventually detected by one of more of a small, well-de ned set of landing pads. This is equivalent to assuming the fail-stop failure model of 13 .
Replication of data and control is what enables an itinerant computation to recover from faults. We can characterize how m uch replication is needed in terms of a parameter, f. One simple characterizaton is given by:
Bounded Crash Rate. For any i n teger 0 i f, there can be no more than i crashes of hosts or landing pads during the maximum period of time it takes the agent to traverse i distinct hosts.
This characterization is convenient because f remains xed during the entire itinerant computation. However, a more practical characterization would have f depending on the host currently being visited how reliable is it? and on the current state of the itinerant computation. We use the Bounded Crash Rate characterization in this paper for expository simplicity; extending our protocols to more realistic characterizations is straightforward.
Finally, each pair of hosts in the network is assumed to be connected by a FIFO communications link that masks communications failures. In Section 6, we revisit this assumption and discuss how to adapt NAP to networks that can partition. An action fails if that action experiences a fault during its execution. A fault that occurs between the execution of two fault-tolerant actions is attributed to one or the other. So, it is possible for all of the user's code in A to execute, yet to have A also execute because a fault occurs just after A nishes. However, once a subsequent action A 0 starts executing, a fault will result in A 0 executing rather than A executing.
Fault-tolerant actions are general enough to program any kind of fault-tolerance scheme that is based on detection and recovery. F or example, given an operation undo redo mechanism 3 , fault-tolerant actions can be used to implement atomic transactions.
The recovery action that an agent should take will most likely be changed when that agent moves or spawns a new agent. Hence, move and spawn both are de ned as terminating an action. 2 For example, Figure 1 shows an itinerant computation originating with a1 1 . The second version of agent a1, a1 2 , starts when a1 1 executes move naming host H2 and terminates by executing spawn. The spawn creates both the third version a1 3 of a1, still on H2, and the third version a2 3 of a new agent a2 on H4. By convention, we de ne a1 2 to be the second version of a1 and a2.
a1 [2] a1 [3] a1 [4] a1 [5] a2 [4] a2 [5] a2 [3] a1 [ Figure 1 : Versions of Mobile Agents tacoma agents can be written in many di erent languages, so fault-tolerant actions are encoded rather than being programmed using the syntax given above. For this encoding, the state of a tacoma mobile agent is described in a data structure called a briefcase. A briefcase stores a named set of folders, hname; valuei pairs; each of the names in the briefcase is unique. A tacoma mobile agent's briefcase would have v e folders associated with fault-tolerant actions and two additional folders associated with recovery actions. The purpose of these folders is summarized in Table 1 .
The e ect of move and spawn can be described operationally in terms of folders. For example, moveb starts executing the program given as the head 3 A fault during exection of a regular action invokes the associated recovery action, and a fault during execution of a recovery action causes that recovery action to be re-executed. With NAP, the recovery action executes on some landing pad that was recently visited by the itinerant computation. When a regular action executing with a briefcase b experiences a fault, the code for the recovery action is the head of b:recovery. A mobile agent can interact with its environment, and|at times|the mobile agent will need to change its recovery action for such i n teraction. For example, suppose a mobile agent nds some information on a host it is visiting, and because of this information the mobile agent decides to delete a local le. If this le should be deleted no matter how the local information changes, then the recovery action should change to ensure that the le is eventually deleted. This need to change recovery actions is a manifestation of the output commit problem 6 : before taking an irrevocable action, the mobile agent ensures that its current state is stable so that any recovery action will have the information that led to the irrevocable action and will be able to complete the action even if the regular action was interrupted by a fault.
A third tacoma operation, checkpoint, can be used to do ensure that saved state is stable, so that state is available to recovery actions. Figure 1, for example, shows version a1 4 creating version a1 5 by executing checkpoint. Operationally, checkpointb is like moveb but the new action headb:code is executed at the current landing pad rather than at headb:host and, therefore, the implementation of checkpoint can be cheaper than implementing it directly with move.
Appendix A contains a tacoma mobile agent that illustrates the implementation of fault-tolerant actions by use of the tacoma move, spawn, and checkpointoperations.
Protocol
At a high level, implementing NAP is simple. Consider a regular action a i executing at a landing pad L i . When a i terminates, the identity of the next landing pad L i+1 is the head of the host folder in current briefcase b. We can thus achieve the desired behavior for NAP if L i uses a reliable broadcast protocol 7 to send b to a set Ga i of landing pads, where the rear guards for a i and the landing pad L i+1 are in Ga i . Reliable broadcast guarantees that all nonfaulty landing pads in Ga i either deliver b or do not deliver b. This implies that L i+1 crashed. A rear guard for a i + 1 i n Ga i will determine this fact and execute the recovery action a i + 1 .
Runtime Architecture
Each host has, in one process, a landing pad thread and a failure detection thread. The landing pad maintains a NAP state object that stores information about mobile agents the host is executing or for which the host serves as a rear guard. The landing pad thread informs the failure detection thread which landing pads to monitor. See below.
Each mobile agent at a host executes in its own process; that process is created by the host's landing pad and, therefore, the reliable broadcast is initiated when mobile agent process exits.
Reliable Broadcast
The reliable broadcast protocol we use for our implementation of NAP is a re nement o f t h e one presented in 15 , instantiated with a linear broadcast strategy." Here is how that works. The reliable broadcast protocol in 15 also implements an election protocol: there is always eventually one process initially p 0 that knows itself to be elected. A process remains elected until it fails. This is important when using arbitrary broadcast strategies, because if p 0 fails, then a process must take o ver to complete the broadcast. The election protocol used in NAP is as follows 3 : Membership. One can think of NAP as a reliable broadcast protocol to a process group, where the group changes with each broadcast. The changes are determined by membership rules: Ga i is de ned to be Ga i , 1 plus a set of landing pads that join Ga i and minus a set of landing pads that leave Ga i . The only requirement on group membership that we require is that Ga i include L i+1 .
Group Ga i must contain at least f +1 members. This rear guard's identity could be included in the broadcast of b i+1 .
One additional membership rule is required for when a mobile agent revisits a landing pad. That landing pad may nd itself twice in the broadcast strategy.
For example, consider agent a2 in Figure 1 . If f = 3 , then Ga2 5 = fH1; H 2; H 4; H 5g where H4 both precedes and follows H5 in the broadcast strategy.
When this happens, the second entry is dropped from the broadcast strategy. For example, the broadcast to Ga2 5 uses the broadcast strategy H4; H5; H2; H1.
Catastrophic Failure. Although not admitted by our failure model, in practice there will be situations such as programming bugs in which recovery action a i will fail repeatedly. All rear guards thus fail. A reasonable response for this case is to pass the briefcase b of the failing agent to a well-known host; we call this host the rally point. The identity of the rally point is speci ed in the rally point folder.
One implementation of would have rally point p rp be a member of the group Ga i for each v ersion i, and to have p rp take over should it detect all of the other members of the group as having crashed. A more e cient implementation is to have at least f +1 rather than f rear guards. If a rear guard nds that all other rear guards have failed, it passes the briefcase to p rp .
Termination. When a mobile agent terminates, the NAP for this agent m ust also terminate. Surprisingly, even though the reliable broadcast protocol that NAP is based on cannot terminate 15 , orchestrating termination of NAP is straightforward. The tacoma operation exit is a command that instructs a landing pad to terminate support for the corresponding mobile agent. Suppose the last user-de ned action of some mobile agent is:
FTA ! : action A ! recovery A ! To orchestrate termination of NAP, FTA ! can be then replaced by t wo actions: action f A ! ; checkpointg recovery A ! ; action exit recovery exit; When the last landing pad executes exit, it will appear to have crashed, resulting in a failure detection 5 The election protocol in NAP will then choose a rear guard to execute the recovery action. The agent that executes the recovery action will then terminate executing NAP, causing another failure detection and another rear guard executing the recovery action. This will continue until all rear guards have terminated executing NAP for this program.
When a rally point is de ned, this termina- 5 Tthe failure detection latency can be reduced by sending an explicit message indicating that the landing pad is terminating.
An illustration of this optimization appears in Appendix A.
Implementation
We h a ve implemented NAP in a Python-based 6 version of tacoma. We c hose Python because it is a convenient language for prototyping. Of primary concern was deciding how w e w ould integrate NAP into the existing tacoma architecture. The performance of this rst version of NAP in tacoma was of less importance
The cost of doing a move with NAP are given in 6 Conclusions NAP provides fault-tolerance for itinerant compuations at low cost. The replication needed for faulttolerance is obtained by leaving some code running at landing pads the mobile agent visited recently. No additional processors are required, and the recovery that a mobile agent performs in response to a crash is something that can be speci ed by the programmer. Thus, when a low cost method of recovery is possible, the programmer can use that method rather than, for example, active replication 14 or primary-backup 12 . We believe that this exibility is especially important when partitioning is possible.
NAP is based on a reliable broadcast that uses a linear broadcast strategy. A linear broadcast strategy results in a simple rule for determining when a landing pad should be dropped from the rear guards. For small values of f, the latency of NAP is subsumed by the cost of a move, the most common method of terminating a regular action. The latency is not subsumed by the cost of a spawn, though. The latency could be reduced by using a broadcast strategy with a larger fanout than our linear broadcast strategy. We are examining versions of NAP built using such broadcast strategies for itinerant computations that frequently use spawn and checkpoint.
NAP, as presented here, cannot be implemented in a system that can experience partitions, because no crash failure-detector can be implemented in such a system. However, in systems that can partition, processes within the same partition can agree on which processes are unreachable even though they cannot distinguish between the case of the unreachable process being crashed or being partitioned away 16 . With such a failure detector, a network partitioning into two connected components may lead to a regular action and its recovery action both executing without failing.
We are currently designing a version of NAP that provides better support for partitioned operation. The failure detection thread for this version is as described above: it implements consistent detection within a set of connected landing pads of the unreachability of the other landing pads. This version also has a set of tools that aid the tacoma programmer in writing a tacoma mobile agent that executes in a partitionable environment. For example, tacoma already provides a mechanism for the transactional update of collections of folders on stable storage. We plan to use this mechanism to allow applications to have the same measure of fault-tolerance that, for example, the protocol of 12 gives. It will also allow for applications more demanding than those supported by 12 , such as those for which a transaction spans many landing pads. For mobile agents that do not require such strict semantics, we will have tools that provide information on the network's topology and current performance. Such tools allow one to write partition-aware" 2 mobile agents. The mobile agent described in Appendix A is one that we believe would t well into this second class of applications. stub generator AIL to a prototyping language Python. A Example: License Checker
The following description of a tacoma mobile agent illustrates the programming and use of faulttolerant actions. The mobile agent visits a set of hosts, speci ed as a parameter. For each host visited, the mobile agent creates a folder that describes the action the agent took there or whether it found the host to be unavailable. This folder is returned to the originating host.
The mobile agent takes the following actions for each host it visits:
If le license exists and contains the word customer", then the mobile agent renames the le program to old_program and writes a new le program.
If le license exists and contains the word demo", then the mobile agent takes no action.
Otherwise, the mobile agent deletes the le program.
We wish the agent to update the host with some care, however. In the unlikely or perhaps maliciously orchestrated event that the host crashes while the changes are taking place, we w ould like to notify the user who launched the agent.
The agent executes consists of the ve fault-tolerant actions: launch, visit, update, alert, and report. It is started by executing launch on a host that we call the originating host. We assume that the originating host does not crash but it is easy to rewrite this program to use a set of backup hosts should one wish to tolerate failures of the originating host. The ve actions are:
1. launch This action executes move of action visit to the rst host, if there is such a host.
There is no recovery action for this rst action; there is no rear guard yet de ned that will execute it.
visit This action determines the action to take
based on the license le found on the host being visited. A folder is created having the name of the host; the folder records the action to be taken on this host. The action terminates with a checkpoint, causing action update to execute.
The recovery action creates a folder with the name of the host and records the fact that this host was not available. To use the optimistic method for reducing latency as described in Section 4.3, all but visit can be executed without using the wait stable operation. If wait stable were not used at the beginning of the action visit, then it would be possible that, due to a set of failures, both the le system of the host would be updated and the recovery action of the preceding visit action would record that the host was not visited because it was crashed.
B NAP
We n o w specify NAP as an automaton executed by each landing pad.
Each briefcase BC has a unique identi er BC.ID that is set when the briefcase is created. BC.ID does not change value when the briefcase is passed to another landing pad.
A spawn operation is initiated by h a ving the exiting mobile agent give its landing pad two briefcases: one for the newly-spawning agent and one for the continuing agent. A move operation is initiated by h a ving the exiting application mobile agent give only one non-NULL briefcase. A spawn results in two concurrent reliable broadcasts, while a move results in only one reliable broadcast. Although not described above, a spawn can have the continuing agent and the newly-spawned agent each execute on di erent hosts.
A landing pad maintains a table NAPstate that maps a briefcase identi er to the following information:
The version of the agent active that the landing pad believes is being executed; The version numbef for the agent me that was last executed at this landing pad; The landing pad's vector clock VC that is associated with this agent. The vector clock is a table that maps a version i of the agent to the host on which it executed VC i .host and the version of the briefcase that this landing pad believes is stored there VC i .vers. The host can either be a host identi er or the value UNKNOWN. The version can be either a number, the value NONE indicating that the agent has not executed at this landing pad, or the value DOWN indicating that the landing pad has either crashed or otherwise garbage collected information concerning this briefcase. The value VC.vers can be thought o f a s a v ector clock o f u n bounded length where the values of VC i .vers for versions that have not yet executed are set to NONE, and the values for versions that have been garbage collected are set to DOWN. Hence, only a bounded set of values need to be maintained in VC i .vers. The vers component of VC is treated like a n y v ector clock 10 where NONE less than any i n teger and DOWN is greater than any i n teger.
To k eep the pseudocode for the protocol as short as possible without losing its essential structure, we do not describe initial agent startup, agent termination or keeping additional rear guards for when the number of rear guards drops too low then moving the agent t o one of the hosts speci ed in BC.rally_point. 
